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CURRICULUM CHANGES: PHILOSOPHY AND
THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
VERSUS
A DEVIL'S ADVOCATE.
PAUL J. GODA *
I. INTRODUCTION
The pressures for curriculum changes in our law schools today are mani-
fest and widespread. The variation of suggested rationales for changes in
the curriculum towards the first degree in law ranges from the heights of
the policy directed law school or legal directed law school to the depths of
the skill directed law school, drifting back to the plateau of the combined pur-
poses law school, making for the best or the worst of all possible law school
worlds.'
Obviously behind this multiplicity of curriculum policies is a battle of ulti-
mate objectives. Professor Shuman has put it well: 2
What is puzzling is that despite the shared feeling of dissatisfaction,
there is so little agreement on curricular reform. This is largely
due to a lack of consensus on a philosophy of legal education out
of which some curricular reform could be expected. And this, in
turn, is due to a lack of agreement on the values which are regarded
as durable and desirable in the society where we live and where
our law graduates will practice.
Eighteen years ago, Professor Lon Fuller, in a brilliant article, 3 asked for
a determination of goals, not only in teaching law but in living out the law as
a profession. He even suggested the need for a metaphysics. That debate is
still going on. A "Symposium on Philosophy and Legal Vocationalism" in
the Journal of Legal Education made much the same plea for a philosophy
of our objectives.4
In this paper, I would like to shift the grounds of the debate because I think
it is futile to found legal education on any ultimate legal philosophy, let alone
any ultimate philosophy.5 The questioning that is part of the seeking of ob-
jectives and goals is certainly a part of legal education. But I fear that in
the thrust for change, legal education may be undergoing an identity crisis.
Legal education may react like an adolescent by refusing to acknowledge
that it has a limited scope within the pluralism of American culture.
• Father, Church of the Nativity, New York City.
1 Cf. "Report of the Curriculum Committee," Proceedings: Part I, Reports of Com-
mittees and Projects, 1966 Annual Meeting. American Association of Law Schools,
Washington, D. C., 1966. pp. 37-55.
2 
"Introductory Remarks by the Chairman," Symposium on Philosophy and Legal
Vocationalism: Theoretical Considerations and Practical Proposals. 19 Journal of
Legal Education 169 (1966). p. 169.
3 Lon L. Fuller, On Teaching Law. 3 Stanford Law Review 35 (1950-51).
4 Symposium, op. cit., p. 169.
5 To avoid any misconceptions, the reader is informed that the author is committed
to a philosophy which has a metaphysics and to a natural law system in ethics.
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Paradoxically, it seems to me that the answers for which we are seeking
within the particular institution of legal education may be discovered in the
trends towards specialization and towards inter-disciplinary courses which
are expanding the curriculum today. Both of these trends cause tensions and
contradictions within the structure of curriculum change. Both of these
trends have given some answers to the new objectives of legal education.
I intend to speak somewhat as a Devil's Advocate with reference to changes
in legal education today, not to condem the changes, much less the ferment
and rethinking of legal values, but to pose some problems which seem to me
to have escaped the debate.6
When I said that legal education might be reacting like an adolescent, this
meant simply that law might be arrogating to itself a dominant position in
American society. It is, perhaps, one thing to say that law now permeates
every activity.7 This is only a statement of observation. It is entirely an-
other thing to say: 8
Today we lack-and desperately need-a profession concerned with
the overall structuring of society. Where most areas, even philosophy
and the social sciences, have become increasingly specialized, students
of law have, of necessity remained generalists. This is so because
law touches all areas of life, and because it touches life in a prescrip-
tive sense-by the setting of standards-and thus it unavoidably
treats of society as it ought to be. Hence the study of law as a sub-
ject matter must be in a study of society in the moral sense of ought
and should . . . Herein lies law's responsibility to be, not
merely in apostrophe but in reality, the queen of the humanities.
Or one may gently say, and it is true: 9
It is not only because the law school is eminently equipped for the
task of meeting today's challenge, but because there is a special rela-
tionship of law to societal needs, of ideologies to law, and of the
lawyer to society. Having undertaken a virtual monopoly of legal
education, the law school cannot shirk its task.
But does this mean an extreme? 10
. . . law is steadily becoming more pervasive and influential
in directing and managing the affairs of society. Law, as the guise
worn by government, is assuming many functions that were pre-
viously undertaken by other agencies: family, church, school, and
various associations. Law is now dearly the dominant social force,
and we are being transformed into a legalistic society.
Besides being rampant legalism, about which more later, such an attitude
is not only similar to the omnivorous craving of some of the developing so-
6 Cf. Roundtable on Curricular Reform, 20 Jourtal of Legal Education. 379 (1968)
which does not raise these issues.
7 Charles A. Reich, Toward the Humanistic Study of Law. 74 Yale Law Journal
1402 (1965). p. 1407.
8SId., p. 1408.
9 Dexter L. Hanley, S.3., "Theoretical Study Within Schools," in Symposium, op.
cit., p. 190.
10 Iredell Jenkins, "Legal Institutions, the Legal Profession, and the Discipline of
Law," in Symposium, op. cit., pp. 172-173.
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cial sciences, which are themselves still only in the process of development,
but also feeds the fear the social sciences not so surprisingly still have of the
dominance of law. One political scientist crammed both attitudes into a short
paragraph: I
No longer a hostage to history, and freed at last from its bondage
to the lawyers as well as from the arid schematism of the political
taxonomists, political science is in the process of becoming one of the
central unifying forces for understanding why we behave like human
beings.
Although the author who makes this quotation comments that this is a short
view and far too optimistic, he does not bother to disavow the antagonism to
law.
It is somewhat amusing to read an ex-Harvard Law School student state
that his best classroom instructors were in law school and not at H-arvard
Graduate School or at Harvard College. 2  But it is frightening to read of
the problems of legal education in French universities, which apparently are
undergoing the same crises of integration versus specialization, of philosophy
versus vocationalism, which we are undergoing, but from an extreme posi-
tion rather than from a middle area. Their law schools have dropped from
41% of total enrollment in 1910 to 15% in 1963, as well they might have.
The Facultes de Droit now have three sections, Public Law, Private Law
and the Economic Sciences. This split is recent. Until 1953, there was no
specialization possible at the license level. But this does not mean specializa-
tion in our sense. Public law, private law and the broad scope of economics
were all part of one and the same degree. The very attempt to keep so much
together was apparently the reason why the system of legal education grew
out of touch with the needs of the community?13
II. TENSIONS AND CONTRADICTIONS WITHIN OUR BASIC
PROBLEMS.
It is trite to say that modem pressures are causing changes within the
structures of society and that legal institutions must change with these pres-
sures. It is equally trite to say that we live in an age of accelerated change,
when the speed and multiplicity of changes demand swifter reaction. But it
must be emphasized that the law as we know it, that body of structures and
documents and men which is formally and informally organized into an insti-
tution, will always suffer from cultural lag. The formal will aways lag be-
1 Peter H. Odegard, "A New Look at Leviathan," in Lynn White, Jr., ed., Frontiers
of Knowledge in the Study of Man. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1950, p. 94,
quoted in Heinz Bulau, "Segments of Political Science Most Susceptible to Behavior-
istic Treatment," in James C. Charlesworth, ed., The Limits of Behavioralism in
Political Science. The American Academy of Political and Social Science, Phila-
delphia, Oct. 1962. p. 28.
32 William M. Johnston, Teaching in the Law School: A Model for Other Uni-
versity Divisions. 37 Journal of Higher Education 159 (1966). p. 159.
13 "Law in French Universities: Confusion About Recent Changes," The Times
EducationaZ Supplement. London: Sept. 20, 1963, No. 2522, p. 336. I am not sure
how the law schools were affected by the spring riots of 1968; certainly a process
of decentralization in higher education is continuing.
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hind the informal. At its peril, it cannot lag too far behind; but similarly at
its peril, the formal structure cannot outstrip too far its surroundings. 4
I must emphasize that I do not wish to overlook the need for change and
that I realize that the legal educational system must not become trapped in
technical processes, in what is, perhaps to facilely, called vocationalism. It
has been well said: '
An organization that is organized around a particular body of tech-
nology or professional skill is likely to be very bad at judging its
effectiveness, by comparison with other special skills, in accomplish-
ing a political purpose. Moreover, the most common fault of any
organization is to fail to adapt to change, and this failure most often
takes the form of worrying more and more about the technical proc-
esses that it uses, and caring less and less about its essential pur-
poses.
The changes to which the law must adapt today are so many and so varied
that I fear we may be overzealous in changing by losing sight of the law's
essential purposes. We may paradoxically be smothered, not so much by
going off in all directions at one time, as by trying to solve all the ills of men
at one time in one specialized field (which is not really so different).
What are some of the changes? First, there are the obvious ones.
the theoretical, social and moral heritage that has hitherto constituted the tra-
ditional framework of law is rapidly being eroded, if not exhausted .
So law is operating more and more in an actual, ideal, and intellectual vacu-
um." ' 6 True to a point and yet I think that the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court have really been an attempt to make the ideals behind
our political structure become actual in our tumultuous present. "The . . .
pressure arises from the accelerating development of a national and inter-
national situation which has forced us to confront the chasm which separates
some harsh actualities of our life from some of our most deeply regarded
ideals." 17
But attempts to implement equal justice before the law, voting rights and
due process, may touch many lawyers only indirectly (to their shame) although
these are the more publicized developments. There has also been a vast
change in property which has transformed it from the simple bundle of rights
which was private and to be defended by law and lawyer against other private
rights or against a simpler form of government.
It has been only a few years since an excellent study on pension funds
brought home the point of an older study that corporate ownership of much
of our productive property has meant that owners no longer control their
14 Cf. however N. S. Timasheff, An Introduction to the SocioZogy of Law, Harvard
University Committee on lesearch in the Social Sciences, Cambridge, 1939, p. 342,
with his own definition of cultural lag which denies that law can lag behind because
the evading behavior is still partly determined by law.
15 Don K. Price, The Scientific Estate. The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, 1965. pp. 184-85.
16 Iredell Jenkins, "Legal Institutions, the Legal Profession, and the Discipline of
Law," in Symposium, op. cit., pp. 172-73.
17 J. D. Hymen, Concerning the Responsibility and Craftsmanship of the Judge:
A Review of Julius Stone's "Legal System and Lawyers' Reasoning" in the Light of
Recent Criticism of the Supreme Court. 14 Buffalo Law Review 347 (1964-65). pp.
360-61.
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property and that we are becoming a paraproprietal society. The connection
between man and things is becoming attenuated: 18
. . . power does not follow property, as has often been said,
but the power really attaches to him who controls the use of property
. . . Therefore, if the right to use property be separated from
ownership, as happened in the modern corporate system and the
domainal system, power separates from ownership and goes to him
who holds control.
A second conclusion follows immediately. The power which fol-
lows control of property gravitates to those who can use property
a man's relationship to things-material wealth-no long-
er determines his place in society (as it did in a strong proprietary
system) but his place in society now determines his relationship to
things.
Lawyers could accept this kind of change in property rights, although it
meant that greater control was in the hands of managers. After all, the
lawyers made the corporation a creature of law. But hard on the heels of
this mammoth change in property was another, the result of the acceleration
in technological change. Brainpower has become an even more evanescent
form of property than stocks. Moreover, this brainpower is both public and
private."
-This combination puts the lawyer into a new relationship with public law.
Not only the more spectacular developments in rights of indigent criminals
and poverty law, but the problems of political authority with respect to prop-
erty are in issue. With vast support by the government of basic and applied
sciences, we have been put into the position of taking the bundle of rights
which was private property and the bundle of powers and functions which is
government and thoroughly mixed them up.20
But this does not necessarily put the lawyer into a position of greater power.
Now, not only is the manager in a stronger position in American society be-
cause of corporate growth, but the scientist as well. A 1962 study indicated
that of 7640 Federal civil servants in the top ranks, only 3% had been
lawyers. Of the very top positions within the career civil service, only 8 out
of 63 were lawyers. There was a far higher proportion of scientists in both
categories.2 '
18 Paul P. Harbrecht, S.J., Pension Funds and Economic Power, The Twentieth
Century Fund, New York, 1959. pp. 278,286-87.
19 Price, op. cit., p. 44: " . . . the new basic sciences, by their inherent nature,
have carried forward by a large jump the change in the nature of property that had
been made by the old industrial technology. The old technology fostered the growth
of private corporations, and made their stocks a new kind of liquid property. The
new science has made some property almost ethereal. Or, in less metaphorical terms,
it has based some very fast-growing forms of property on brainpower, and on the
terms and conditions under which the humans who have that asset are related to
public authority."
20 Ibid., p. 49.
21 Ibid., p. 61.
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The attitude of some scientists is instructive. Robert L. Hershey, Vice-
President of E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co. has said: 2
In my opinion, the reason why the American steel industry, by and
large, has not been more progressive is that until recent years its
management has largely been made up of lawyers; scientifically
trained and technically oriented men have not had leading positions
among its top executives.
Whatever the facts about percentages and power of lawyers in important
offices, the undoubted ferment about law in American society has led many
to wonder about the ferment in legal education. Besides the legitimate needs
for change and adaptation, one wonders if there is not a certain element of
panic and haste, especially when the stated goal is to set the lawyer into the
posture of the social engineer.
There seems to be an identity crisis of the lawyer as a professional which
hits the law schools the hardest because they are much more sensitive and
aware of the storm of change. It is my contention that we must properly
limit what we think of ourselves as lawyers. We must give up both a con-
servative professional loyalty and a liberal legalism which seeks to be domi-
nant over all of society.
I do not believe that these strictures are empty. I have quoted some indi-
cations earlier which almost proudly proclaim that we are becoming a legalistic
society. A recent round table in the Tournal of Legal Education sharpens
my point. Dr. Judith Shklar has written a most impressive work on legalism.
She was invited to discuss the subject with law professors and bravely ac-
cepted. She emphasized that judicial institutions are not neutral, that they
are of necessity a stabilizing force in society for all their responsiveness to
social changes 2 3  The law is an institution and an ethos which can lock
lawyers and legal theorists in upon themselves in legalism.2 4
But Dr. Shklar at the end of her paper pointedly said that she did not con-
demn the whole range of legalism: -5
The foregoing suggestions for a reconsideration of legalism as a con-
cept and a practice have no other objective than to give legal theory
a greater relevance. They do not imply a criticism of legalism as an
ethos or of law as an institution. It must be repeated that the hope
is that a greater degree of social self-awareness will make legalism
a more effective social force, a more intelligible and defensible po-
litical ideology and a more useful concept in social theory.
22 Dean Morse and Alron W. Warner, editors, Technological Innovation and Society.
Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1966. p. 64.
23 Judith N. Shklar, "In Defense of Legalism," in Legalism: The Jurisprudence
Roundtable. 19 JournaZ of Legal ducation 49 (1966). pp. 57-58. Cf. Timasheff,
op. cit., pp. 334-40. The most general function of law is to create oider, peace, se-
curity, organization.
24 Shklar, "In Defense of Legalism," in Legalism, op. cit., pp. 51-52: "Like many
other belief systems, however, legalism can and does limit the analytical perspective
of its adherents. It is only when this happens that it becomes an intrusive ideology.
When it prevents one from recognizing that the ethos of legalism is but one among
many and that it may not always be an adequate response to every social need, it is
a real hindrance to the development of a legal theory that has real sociological sig-
nificance."
25 Ibid., p. 58.
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Professor Shuman in his reply seemed to respond self-defensively when he
thought that Dr. Shklar's point was that legalism was utterly wrong. Indeed,
he seemed to flee from a real confrontation of values.26 Prof. Jones in his
response tried to limit legalism into a minor question of legal process, a
synonym for a legal malfunction. 27 He suggests that there is no confronta-
tion in legal education with legalism of any kind 28 and thus fails to meet Dr.
Shklar's arguments directly as to what the legal institution really is. For law
teaching is an entrance into legalism, into the law as an institution set up by
men.
III. TENSIONS AND CONTRADICTIONS WITHIN SOME OF THE
SOLUTIONS POSED TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL EDU-
CATION.
To say that legal education introduces us into a legalism, I must emphasize
again, is not to speak a condemnation, but a warning. The term legalism in
the sense in which Dr. Shklar used it is intended to demonstrate the strength
and weakness of legal education and of law. The law as we know it is an
institution set up to guide men in their communal ventures. It has purpose,
function, structure. It is highly practical and lives in the ongoing problems
of the community. It is not frozen because nothing practical can be frozen.
There must be initiative and change for real justice. The legal profession,
for example, has never been doctrinaire about extreme theories of political
sovereignty: 29
It was of course not the scientists, but the lawyers, who saved us
from this dogmatic belief. Some people still think that the function
of judges is simply to interpret and apply the laws that legislatures
enact, and the function of administrators merely to administer such
laws. This was the conception of the extreme doctrinaires of both
the American and French revolutions . . .. But the lawyers
in the tradition of the common law never held with such nonsense.
They knew that justice required a great deal of initiative and in-
ventiveness from a profession with a corporate tradition. They
knew that the political authority of a legislature would be destroyed,
rather than enhanced, if the legal profession and the judiciary looked
to it for all ideas and initiative, and failed to exercise their own.
The same well-educated man who suggested that his best classroom in-
structors had been in law school founded this phenomenon on the law teach-
ers' "unabashed assumption that the task of education is to prepare students
for life." How to use a bureaucracy, how to use professors and objectivity
through humility before such a vast subject were the foundation principles.
He posed the challenge, and the dilemma, of the law rather neatly in a short
epigram. "A scholar shapes his field; a lawyer serves his." a0 If one is
caught up in a profession, more accurately in an institution, there are institu-
26 Samuel 1. Shuman, "Legalism: Asset, Nuisance, Necessary Evil or Illusion?" In
Legalism, op. cit., pp. 60-61.
27 Ernest M. Jones, "Legal Education Confronts Legalism," In Legalism, op. cit.,
pp. 73-74.
28TbiaZ., pp. 75--76.
29 Price, op. cit., pp. 64-65.
30 Johnston, op. cit., p. 161.
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tional practices which demand a certain amount of formalism in order to
achieve practical results.
All this can be, of course, a weakness. To overemphasize formalism and
limitation is to have petrified. The scholar should criticize and shape his field
and there should be legal scholars. The man who can combine both the old
and the new, the formal and the informal is valuable-and rare.
3
'
But it is not with this sufficiently developed antinomy that I wish to deal.
Rather, it is with some of the hidden tensions and contradictions within some
of the attempted solutions which try to avoid the Scylla and Charybdis of
legal education, the over-generalization of philosophy on the one hand
and the over-technical aspects of vocationalism on the other.
It has been denied, and rightly denied I think, that legal education is basi-
cally a specialized mental discipline.32 And Prof. Fuller is correct in ironically
disposing of the assumption that legal education is a process of habituating
the student "to restrictions that the traditions of the legal profession have
evolved for the governance of its mental operations." 33
But I suspect that it is too simple to come back with the opposite extreme,
and to say, again with Prof. Fuller, that "the only discipline we should seek
in law school is that which sets the student's mind free, not that which makes
it comfortable within a framework imposed on it from outside." 34 This,
it seems to me, is subtly unifying legal education with mental discipline by
another, sweeter name.
Or it has been said that law schools have kept the subject matter secondary
to methodology. Thus it is suggested that our solutions should be a study
in depth of various subject matters: 3
Such a course need not and should not become the watered down
study of philosophy or history or social science. The focus and
object of study would remain questions that are uniquely legal. But
it would be law in greater depth, intensity and excitement.
My problem is the natural retort, what is uniquely legal? And how does
what is uniquely legal relate to curriculum choice? We have already denied
the standard of an interiorized mental discipline, which would be a standard
for "locating areas of greatest relevance, usually technical, and concentrating
31. Prof. Fuller long ago sufficiently developed the theme of this problem for legal
education, op. cit., pp. 42-43: "Herein lies a dilemma for student and teacher. The
good student really wants contradictory things from his legal education. He wants
the thrill of exploring a wilderness and he wants to know where he stands every
foot of the way. He wants a subject matter sufficiently malleable so that he can feel
that he himself may help to shape it, so that he can have a sense of creative partici-
pation in defining and formulating it. At the same time he wants that subject so
staked off and nailed down that he will feel no uneasiness in its presence and ex-
perience no fear that it may suddenly assume unfamiliar forms before his eyes.
No teacher is skilled enough to satisfy these incompatible demands. I don't think
he should try. Rather he should help the student to understand himself, should help
him to see that he wants (and very naturally and properly wants) inconsistent things
of his legal education."
32 Reich, op. cit., p. 1402; Fuller, op. cit., pp. 36-37. cf. Neal H. Tracy, The ProcesR
of Curricular Change. 47 The High School Journal 170 (1963-64). p. 175.
33 Fuller, op. cit., pp. 36-37.
34 Ibid., p. 38.
35 Reich, op. cit., p. 1404.
1969] COMMENTS 213
HeinOnline  -- 22 J. Legal Educ.  213 1969-1970
JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION
our efforts there, or justifying whatever we wish to include on some theory
of mental discipline." 36
Rather, so said the same man, we must have "goals stated in terms of the
behavior expected of a professional . . 37 These goals are not struc-
tured internally from within the profession since the goals depend on the
needs of society. A part of these goals must be technical competence, not on
any theory of mental discipline, but on the theory of societal needs.
We must here turn away from the world of the scholar, the world that is
shaped only by criticism, and face up to the basic necessities of legal educa-
tion for the first degree in law. Without succumbing to the inherent over-
reaching in the following words, we can accept the underlying theory: 3s
. . .I suggest that the essence of law is disclosed in the fact
that it is an agent of mediation between the realms of the actual and
the ideal. Law is a specific vehicle that man creates and employs to
help in the realization of a social order that will be conformable to his
human values and aspirations.
More specifically, law is not just a science: 39
Enginering [sic), medicine, and law, in different ways, have the
function of taking the abstractions of science (or other systematic
knowledge) and applying them to the concrete and practical affairs
of men. That is not only their function; it is their purpose. Science
can insist on ignoring questions of purpose in order to be objective
and precise; the professions cannot. . . . Each [profession]
is organized around a combination of social purpose and a body of
knowledge . . .. Each is organized as an almost corporate en-
tity, with some control over its standards of admission.
This is the point at which I think we can learn something about legal edu-
cation from the interdisciplinary approaches which many have been advo-
cating.40 The social sciences have pointed out that law, the law I should say,
cannot use a holistic approach. Law is a formal institution, with certainty
and definiteness in order to promote the practical realities of everyday living.
The law will thus have the limitations of its institutional existence.
Timasheff points out that law is one of the forms of social coordination.
It is specialized because it is ethico-imperative, characterized by support from
"centralized power and its coordinating activity, and not merely by the mutual
36 Tracy, op. cit., p. 175.
37 Ibid.
38 Iredell Jenkins, "Legal Institutions, the Legal Profession, and the Discipline of
Law" in Symposium, op. cit., pp. 173-74.
39 Price, op. cit., pp. 122-23, 133.
40 It should be said parenthetically that the lesson should have been learned In
trying to teach law in the liberal arts. Cf. Francis Elwood Barkman, "Law-in-the-
Liberal Arts: an Appraisal and a Proposal for Bxperimentation. 19 Journal of Le-
gal Bducation 1 (1966), p. 34: "Much of law-stuff is strictly a matter of acquired
taste, a taste not essential for the average liberal arts graduate. Life in this world
would be miserable indeed if all men were lawyers. Accordingly the suggestion is
advanced that we stop talking to liberal arts students and teaching them in their law
courses as though we were trying to make them into lawyers."
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social interaction which produces and reinforces the ethical group-convic-
tion." 41
American sociologists tend to be more precise and pragmatically oriented
in describing the legal institution. Law is formal social control, related to
,certain informal controls. And the connection with certainty through docu-
ments is inescapable: 4
It has been maintained that handwriting is essential to formal control
because of the need for keeping records. Accounts of legal rules,
rule interpretations, and rule enforcement must somehow be kept.
The fact that [some groups] have memorized a great number of pre-
cise regulations suggests that writing and printing are not essential
to express rules, but they do greatly facilitate explicitness. It is diffi-
cult to conceive of modern legal systems apart from the masses of
printed materials.
The law as an institution is committed to a legal-institutional approach, to
the formalities of community living. A legal-institutional approach is and
must be formal and does not encompass what we call the "informal" aspects
of living in community.4 3 If there is any place where the formal meets the
informal, it must be in what has been called the frontiers of the law, in those
situations (and for legal education in those courses) where we cannot be
definite because the institutions have not been formed to meet societal needs.
It seems to me to be of importance to compare our problems with those
of some of the social sciences. At least some social sciences have seen that
the political scientist, for example, cannot compete with the practicing lawyer
because of the huge amount of information in law books. The legal-institu-
tional approach to political science is most inviting because it seems so defi-
nite and certain. 'But the further problem of the political scientist is that
very few events are explainable in terms of legal categories. 44
There is another way to understand the legal-institutional approach. Al-
though Langdel's case-method approach is not followed today in its pure
form, and although the philosophy of his approach, that "printed books were
the ultimate sources of all legal knowledge" 45, cannot be tolerated if we wish
to avoid a vocationalism in law, documentary collection and interpretation are
still at the heart of the lawyer's trade precisely because the law is a formalized
institution and because communal society demands some sort of certainty
and predictive capacity for the exigencies of practical living. This is a public
expectation of the profession of law which no amount of societal innovation
can eliminate.
I am not writing a brief for the Langdell method. But I am saying that
the legal-institutional approach is at the heart of formal legal education. An
41 Timasheff, op. cit., pp. 12-16, esp. i5. Cf. James F. Davis, Henry H. Foster, Jr.,
Ray 0. Jeffery, Eugene E. Davis, Society and the Law. The Free Press of Glenco%.
1962. pp. 58-59. The authors accuse Timasheff of combining law and ethics.
42 Davis, op. cit., pp. 41-44.
43 Samuel Kriskov, "The Legal-Institutional Approach," in Donald H. Riddle, Rob-
ert S. Cleary, ed., Political Science in the Social Studies. 36th Yearbook, National
Council for the Social Studies, Washington, D. C., 1966. p. 39.
44 Ibid., pp. 39-41.
45 Albert J. Harno, Legal Education in the United States. Bancroft-Whitney CJo.,
San Francisco, 1953. p. 129.
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important part of that approach is the formality of documentation, its collec-
tion and interpretation.
The price we have to pay for being professionals who must fulfill certain
expectations of the community is that we must prepare first of all for those
expectations, not as technicians or vocationalists, but to know what we are
about when we do try to reach out to the frontiers of the law. The strength
of law, the law, the legal institution, is its possibility for precision and
practical implementation. If we throw this away, we may as well become
political scientists or what you will within the fields of the behavioral scien-
tists. The behavioral and social scientists are starting to recognize their limi-
tations; we should recognize ours.
There is no disputing the inadequacy of the legalistic approach for com-
plete solutions to human problems. The incompleteness is not just a philo-
sophical concept. Once any sort of Brandeis brief approach is attempted,
mere documentary collection and interpretation are useless. 46 But the more
moderate social scientist who recognizes behavioralism as a tool realizes
that he cannot manipulate the whole of life either: 47
It requires more than behaviorally derived statements to "under-
stand" politics. And to answer questions posed by the problems of
consciously and deliberately ordering human affairs, one must neces-
sarily resort to "dialectic," as many classical thinkers would have
put it; to over-all judgments about possible historical tendencies
(admittedly a shaky venture at best and one which can never be
"scientific") ; and to the kind of reasoning characteristic of the
judge and the lawyer.
Thus in a surprising fashion, we are brought full circle, back to the rea-
soning of the judge and lawyer, not because of some idea of mental training,
but because the judge and the lawyer are faced with doing, with activity in
a practical order which demands that responses be institutionalized and made
definite. The first major steps in legal education must wrestle with this
prime factor of the institutional processes of the law, with documentation
and the quasi-certitude of law. The behavioral sciences are at their weakest
when studying these institutional arrangements.
48
It seems to me, then, that interdisciplinary courses in legal education should
be placed later in legal education, not just as a chronological matter, but at
that stage of education where familiarity with the legal institution, with
legalism, of which he is becoming a part, will enable the law student to bring
his pre-legal and legal training to bear critically and creatively.4 Experi-
ments of this kind have been activated. One school is giving up to one-fourth
of the total credits in third year to individual, supervised research, using a
field of interest as the environment of study. It is said that the traditional
Socratic method will not be displaced and that there is no intention of mak-
ing the students into specialists.50
46 Milton Derber, What the Lawyer can Learn from Social Science. 16 Journal
of Legal Education 145 (1963-64). pp. 147-48.
47 Mulford Q. Sibley, "The Limitations of Behavioralism" in Charlesworth, op. oit.,
pp. 69-70, 87-88, 92-93, of. pp. 72-73.
48 Charlesworth, op. cit., p. 6.
49 Harno, op. cit., p. 146.
50 Professional Education: Course Change in Law School, 95 School and Society
103 (Feb. 18, 1967). pp. 103-4.
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It should be evident that the three years of legal education leading to the
first degree in law cannot be made into a specialty course either without
turning legal education into vocationalism. The specialized courses that so
many law schools are putting in will hopefully be on the frontiers of law where
basic legal education can meet the problems of modern society in an academic
atmosphere. There are other methods of specialization, ranging from profes-
sional experiences of a sequence of similar cases to the one big case which
makes a name for the individual, as well as the specialization inherent in
large law firms. And more and more, academic preparation in post-graduate
studies is forming the specialist. 51
Another difficulty in basic legal education is in what one might call philos-
ophy versus legal vocationalism. I personally find this a false dichotomy
with which to begin. The real division is always between education and vo-
cationalism, between an integrated view of human activities which leaves one
free to judge, analyze, criticize and build, and a limited view of one's own
field of competence as purely technical.
To pose the original dichotomy as philosophy versus legal vocationalism
is to set up a false, hidden tension in what we are trying to do with cur-
riculum changes and so to leave the way open for extremist suggestions that
ultimately go nowhere. In the "Symposium on Philosophy and Legal Vo-
cationalism" presented by the Journal of Legal Education in 1966, two of the
participants took a sound middle position on the questions of amount and
emphasis of jurisprudence in the curriculum.
Fr. Hanley, after attempts to interest his colleagues and after setting up
a continuing institute on jurisprudential problems, came to the conclusion
that law professors follow their own bent and interests and that the most
that law schools can and should do is to support jurisprudential and philo-
sophical studies for those who have the inclination. 52
Prof. Joiner put his reasoning more dramatically: 53
How then should philosophy touch this practical world of legal ed-
ucation? It is not enough to say that the world needs more philos-
ophers and all lawyers should become legal philosophers in part by
devoting one-third of their study time to philosophy. Such a result
seems to be as absurd as saying that philosophy cannot aid in the
development of the law or the lawyer.
He too suggests limits. Gifted students who are interested should be allowed
to follow their interest through a system with curricular flexibility giving the
option for jurisprudence courses.54
But, again as Devil's Advocate, I would like to submit a deeper question.
I believe that philosophy, values, ethics, are not fundamentally a legal ques-
51 Hubert J. O'Gorman, Lawiyers and Matrimonial Cases. The Free Press of Glen-
coe, 1963. pp. 50-51. Of. Russel D. Niles, Ethical Prerequisites to Certification of
Proficiency. 49 American Bar Association Journal 83 (1963).
52 "Theoretical Study Within Schools" in Symposium, op. cit., pp. 190-91.
53 Charles W. Joiner, "A Plea for Flexibility in Content and Timing" in Symposi-
um, op. cit., pp. 179-80.
541bid., p. 180.
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tion. This, it seems to me, is what the round table fight with Dr. Shklar was
all about. She suggested: 5
What rules make legal rules, valid legal rules? That alone is held
to be the way to answer all questions about the nature of law. This
empty formalism, designed solely to distinguish legal rules from all
other rules, precludes consideration of law as a social force. One
need only mention Kelsen and Hohfeld and their disciples to see how
confining this pursuit of an exclusively "legal", legal theory has be-
come.
Others, including lawyers, have seen what the acceptance of a dominant,
narcissistic philosophy could do to law. Prof. Cowan put it very well: t0
Characteristically, since it could accept consolation neither from nat-
ural law nor from physical science, Anglo-American law turned in-
ward. English legal theory began to develop as a science of itself.
It proclaimed (through Austin) that jurisprudence is a self-investi-
gating science with closed boundaries.
There was a reductionist tendency in the times, stemming from the triumph
of the physical sciences 5 7 But it should be noted that the behavioral sciences,
the last heirs to this reductionist approach, have been realizing that there are
limitations to that social science methodology which is sibling to analytical
jurisprudence.
Behavioralism and positivism are excellent tools for the determination of
facts and the meaning of the use of words. They are less successful in the
realms of values and ethics.58 An intriguing collection of descriptive essays,
A Current Appraisal of the Behavioral Sciences, is shot through with the
modern struggles between the value-free and policy approaches in the social
sciences. The author suggests the need for hypotheses of the middle-range,
avoiding pure data-gathering or pure deductive methods.59 The spectrum of
theories he gives in his section on jurisprudence is truly startling.60 He
slyly explains, "Although not always recognized, fundamental moral and
value preferences seem to underlie much of this controversy." 1
It should take no belaboring to predict that no unified philosophy will be
accepted by the law schools to solve our curriculum problems. For we have
learned that there is no pure legal philosophy from our own history. What
we do have to learn is that we will not raise up a philosophy for our times out
of the law schools acting as the spearhead for education and social change.
Jurisprudence, then, is a perennial subject on the frontier of the law. It is
not on that frontier in the sense of the specialized or interdisciplinary courses
which attempt the sociological fusion of the formal structures of the law
with the informal pressures of society. Rather, it is on that double frontier
where lawyers must try to integrate their own corporate institution and where
55 "In Defense of Legalism" in Symposium, op. cit., p. 52.
50 Cowan, op. cit., p. 19.
57 Cf. Price, op. cit., pp. 85-86.
58 Derber, op. cit., pp. 152-53.
59 Rollo Handy and Paul Kurtz, A Current Appraisa of the Behavloral Sciences.
Behavioral Research Council, Great Barrington, Mass., 1964. p. 13.
60 Ibid., pp. 69-76.
61 Ibid., pp. 74-75.
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they also collide with the problems of values and ethics that are not legal
but far broader, human problems.
IV. CONCLUSION.
There is nothing that I can say that is startlingly different by way of con-
dusion. I have surprised myself by opting for a first degree course in law
that is still heavily laden with the legal doctrine approach, not as a course in
memory, but with the purpose of giving insight into the legal institution as
it works. It is only when this is done that the student can go out to the
frontiers of the law to work with the social sciences and one's own human
values in any meaningful way as a lawyer.
I suspect that I would choose to leave not only the first year but also the
second year of law school heavily loaded with what we call the traditional
courses. But based on what one has had in college (if in pre-legal education,
by luck or foresight, the student has known what he wanted) or on interest,
the integration process can be attempted.
But this integration process, and this is the warning of this paper, is not
the reductionist approach of an omnivorous law. Nor can it be the oppo-
site reductionism in which theoretical studies usurp the legal-institutional
learning of law. Integration can only be within a true interdisciplinary ap-
proach, where one is subjected to someone who is not in one's own field after
one truly knows one's own field.
Although the legal education of tomorrow may well be interprofessional,
the very author who asks for interprofessionalism places the lawyer's stance
in the concrete posture of the institution of law: 62
The lawyer is not much interested in fact-gathering for its own sake
or at the other extreme with large-scale system building. Instead,
he is interested in facts as they relate to specific legal problems and
bear on crucial social issues that have referents in the empirical
world.
It is into that world that lawyers, who after all are human too, must bring
their values as human beings. So long as the law is not locked in upon itself
and legal education allows an interplay between the institutional forces which
are its strength and the societal forces of values and social pressures, which
are the sources of our legal institutions, there is no need to fear for our cur-
riculum.
62 Davis, op. oit., pp. 395-96.
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